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5 The Transitional Justice Framework
agreed between the Colombian
Government and the FARC—EP1
Camila de Gamboa Tapias and
Fabio Andrés Díaz Pabón
For Katia, a bright shooting star
Introduction
Colombia has experienced a violent conﬂict for more than ﬁve decades. Since
the 1980s, successive governments have implemented diﬀering justice frame-
works in their eﬀorts to achieve peace (see Chapter 4). The government of
President Juan Manuel Santos negotiated a peace agreement with the
FARC—EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Peace talks began
oﬃcially in November 2012, with the parties reaching an agreement on 24
September 2016. While the Constitution did not oblige the President to sub-
ject the agreement to public vote for its approval, President Santos publicly
announced at the beginning of negotiations in 2012 that the agreement would
be subject to a plebiscite. This was considered important for the political
legitimacy of the agreement.
When the Colombian Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality
of the plebiscite in July 2016 (i.e. prior to it taking place), it ruled that the
agreement could be implemented by the President only if the plebiscite resul-
ted in its approval, expressed through a vote of the citizens (Corte Con-
stitucional de Colombia, 2016). In addition, the Colombian Congress had
previously approved a constitutional amendment to give extraordinary
powers to the Santos administration to implement the institutions and pro-
cedures that the agreement called for, and the Congress also had the power to
approve these laws using a ‘fast track’ mechanism.2 Thus, the implementation
of peace agreements depended on the approval of the agreement through the
plebiscite (Congreso de Colombia, 2016a).
On 2 October 2016, Colombians voted in a plebiscite and rejected the
agreement by a razor-thin margin.3 Actors in Colombia and overseas were
perplexed by the results of the plebiscite; it was expected that the possibility
of peace would produce a consensus among Colombian citizens in favour of
the agreement. The vote of the plebiscite against the agreements was not only
a vote against peace; it reﬂected opposition to the demobilization incentives
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given to the FARC—EP in the agreements. Some segments of the Colombian
polity feared losing their economic and political advantages (acquired legally or
otherwise), and other citizens opposed the agreements because they opposed
Santos’s policies in general, rather than the peace agreement speciﬁcally.
The vote against the agreements can be seen as evidence of a reduction in
the state’s legitimacy and the outcome of a dangerous polarization in
Colombian society fuelled by some political parties, such as the Centro
Democrático4, led by former President Uribe. A discourse of scepticism and
fearmongering, coupled with a successful misinformation campaign, framed
the proposed peace as a descent into a communist dystopia (La Silla Vacia,
2016) that would erode traditional family values. This proved eﬀective in
mobilizing Colombians against the agreement.
The success of the campaign against the agreement was aided by the Santos
administration’s ineﬀective communication of the agreement to large sectors
of the population, and the failure of some political parties to adequately
mobilize their constituents in favour of the agreement (Revista Semana, 2016).
The irony of the outcome of the vote is that the agreement was in fact approved
in the majority of the regions which are most aﬀected by the violence (Regis-
traduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016; Fundación Ideas para la Paz,
2016a). The idea of retributive justice and its ‘absence’ from the agreement
was one of the main arguments made by the advocates of the campaign
against the agreements, and one of the most important issues in the political,
juridical, and ethical discussions in Colombia and abroad with regard to the
transitional justice taking place in the country. An amended agreement was
signed and ratiﬁed in November 2016 (see Chapter 3).
In this chapter we analyse the transitional justice framework deﬁned by the
peace agreements between the FARC—EP and the Colombian Government, as
captured in point ﬁve of the ﬁnal agreement signed in Bogotá in November 2016:
the ‘Sistema integral de verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición,
incluyendo la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz; y compromiso sobre Derechos
Humanos.’5 This system is designed to regulate the transitional justice frame-
work agreed upon in the accords. It aims to recognize the rights of victims,
impose certain judicial and extra-judicial burdens upon the members of the
FARC—EP and other armed actors responsible for violations of human rights,
and establishes guarantees of non-repetition through diﬀerent mechanisms.
In analysing the transitional justice framework, we examine the principles
that inspired the agreements on victims and four of the key mechanisms
described in it: the Commission for the Clariﬁcation of Truth;6 the Unit for the
Search for Missing Persons in the Context and as a Result of the Conﬂict;7
measures on Comprehensive Reparation for Peace Building; the Guarantee of
non-Repetition; and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.8
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace and its emergence as an iteration of the
previous transitional justice frameworks implemented in Colombia is
explored in the section which follows. In the ﬁnal section, we analyse some of
the challenges to the implementation of the transitional justice agreements,
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reﬂecting on the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of the agree-
ments, and how this may provide legal stability (or instability) for diﬀerent
constituents and for peace in Colombia.
The principles and mechanisms deﬁned by the transitional
justice agreement
The agreement on the victims of the conﬂict starts with the recognition by the
government and the FARC—EP that the main aim of this agreement is to
compensate victims. In addition, it states that all the measures described in
the agreement are intended to be comprehensive. This introductory portion of
the agreement recognizes that the armed conﬂict in Colombia has multiple
causes, and has resulted in great harm and suﬀering for the population. It
describes the kinds of harms produced by the violence, including forced dis-
placement, deaths, disappearances, sexual violence, and trauma; and it lists
the diﬀerent population groups aﬀected by these harms, including women,
children, and the poorest and most vulnerable population sectors (including
minorities, Romani, indigenous groups and Afro-descendants) (Gobierno de
Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016).
The recognition of all the victims of the conﬂict and of the responsibility of
diﬀerent groups—not only the FARC—EP and the state—for the victims’
conditions is one of the guiding principles of this agreement. The agreements
provide for the participation of victims to assure the satisfaction of their rights,
the clariﬁcation of the truth, reparation for victims, guarantees for their perso-
nal safety, and reconciliation, as well as the guarantee of non-repetition.
A human rights perspective informs the agreements reached and the tran-
sitional justice model agreed on by the parties. This rights perspective is a lens
through which the harm that the armed conﬂict has caused victims is
acknowledged, and informs the approach through which the Government, the
FARC—EP, other groups, and society in general aim to respond to victims’
demands and needs.
The transitional justice system agreed in the peace agreement is considered
to be holistic. In a holistic approach, transitional justice mechanisms are
complementary, in the sense that all eﬀorts to protect the rights of the victims
to justice, truth, reparation, and the guarantee of non-repetition are interrelated
and not exclusive of each other (de Greiﬀ, 2012).
Therefore, the agreement considers that justice cannot be achieved in the
absence of any of the proposed mechanisms or the victims’ rights described
above—all of which are regarded as necessary for justice. The comprehen-
sive system thus entails diﬀerent mechanisms such as: The Commission for
the Clariﬁcation of Truth; The Unit for the Search for Missing Persons in
the Context and as a Result of the Conﬂict; Measures on Comprehensive
Reparation for Peace Building; and the Guarantees of Non-Repetition (see
Figure 5.1).
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The Commission for the Clariﬁcation of Truth, Coexistence, and
Non-Repetition
The agreement recognizes the clariﬁcation of truth, coexistence, and non-
repetition as one of the mechanisms that victims’ organizations have deman-
ded, thus its inclusion not only responds to best practices in the ﬁeld but also
to the citizen’s demands (de Greiﬀ, 2012). The Commission has three goals
(Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016):
i To clarify what happened over the course of the conﬂict by explaining its
complexity and describing the serious human rights violations9 and
breaches of international humanitarian law that occurred in the course of
the confrontations, in order to promote a societal understanding of the
conﬂict and make the lesser-known aspects of the conﬂict visible.
ii To acknowledge victims as: agents whose rights ‘were infringed’ by
society and as political agents who can contribute to the country’s trans-
formation. To recognize the responsibility of all the institutions and
individuals who have participated directly or indirectly in the conﬂict.
iii To promote coexistence in the territories where the conﬂict primarily took
place through the peaceful resolution of conﬂicts and the construction of
a democratic culture that promotes tolerance, co-operation and solidarity.
All these goals are based on the premise that truth-building is essential for
peacebuilding and reconciliation. The goals and mandates of the Commission
for the Clariﬁcation of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition must be
understood in conjunction with the other points of the agreement, such as
rural development; mechanisms for the prevention of the production and
traﬃcking of illicit drugs; and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration
(DDR). This means that in order to build sustainable peace, it is necessary to
undertake the task of a truth commission, but the successful implementation
of the other elements of the agreements by the state are also necessary (see
Chapter 3). Ascribing the whole project of peace and reconciliation to a truth
commission might be overambitious, and can hamper its eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness (de Greiﬀ, 2012).
One of the main aspects of the truth-telling mechanisms included in the
agreement between the FARC—EP and the Government is the principle that
both actors have a moral and political commitment to respect the rights of
victims by contributing to the clariﬁcation of the truth and acknowledging
their responsibilities. It is important to mention that the Commission is not a
judicial body: ‘its activities will not be of a judicial nature and cannot imply
any criminal accusation against any of those who appear before the Com-
mission […] and the information [collected] cannot be transferred by it to
judicial authorities’ (Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016). This serves
in principle to maximize the number of involved actors that can contribute
towards the work of the Commission. This includes illegal actors, individuals
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or institutions that suﬀered directly or indirectly from the conﬂict or partici-
pated in it, and are willing to testify or confess to crimes that they would not
be willing to talk about under other circumstances.
Truth commissions are one of the most commonly used mechanisms to
bring the history and the memory of past human right violations into the
public space in countries transitioning from repressive regimes, civil wars, or
internal conﬂicts. Truth commissions have had diﬀerent purposes and focuses,
emerging in some cases as substitutes for criminal prosecutions, as part of
processes of democratization away from dictatorship, or as part of transitions
away from civil conﬂict. In other cases (in Peru, for example), truth commis-
sions were created prior to the initiation of criminal prosecutions, and their
results were used as inputs in criminal prosecutions.
Currently, truth commissions are understood as an oﬃcial, yet extrajudicial
mechanism that is not meant to replace criminal prosecutions, but rather to
complement the juridical truth with a wider historical account of the political,
economic, and social conditions that gave origin to human rights violations,
so that the actors involved in the violence recognize their actions, and victims
have a space where their histories can be heard (Uprimny Yepes & Saﬀon
Sanín, 2006).
The Colombian Truth Commission’s period of study is the entirety of the
Colombian armed conﬂict, but given that the conﬂict has lasted over 50 years,
the Commission has the authority to establish priorities for its research. The
Commission has a working period of three years to produce a ﬁnal report
(Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016). To clarify the diverse and
complex causes of the conﬂict, the Commission can analyse previous histor-
ical events, and its work can be supported by other previous reports and
research,10 such as the work of the Historical Commission on the Conﬂict
and its Victims11 and other initiatives.
The Search Unit for Missing Persons in the Context and as a Result
of the Conﬂict
The agreement explicitly addresses forced disappearances, given that it is one
of the main crimes of the Colombian armed conﬂict.12 The transitional jus-
tice agreement recognizes that many people have been ‘disappeared’ due to
actions by state agents, the FARC—EP and other armed groups in Colombia.
Some victims’ organizations focusing on disappeared persons expressed their
satisfaction with the establishment and objectives of this unit (Fundación
Ideas para la Paz, 2016b). The goal of the Unit for the Search for Dis-
appeared Persons in the Context and as a Result of the Conﬂict is to con-
tribute to satisfying victims’ rights to truth and reparation. The unit is
transitory, and has a non-judicial, humanitarian character. It has three main
functions (Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016):
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i To account for the universe of disappeared citizens within the armed
conﬂict and identify those still alive.
i To identify the remains of the deceased.
ii To co-ordinate and promote the processes of ‘searching, identifying,
locating, and the digniﬁed return of remains’.
These activities must be co-ordinated with other state institutions such as
the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Science, the Truth
Commission, and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, among others, in order to
report the unit’s actions and provide information, and to allow for the active
participation of victims and their organizations, and international organiza-
tions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Interna-
tional Commission on Missing Persons.
Reparation: Measures for Comprehensive Reparation for Peacebuilding
Another important aspect of the system of justice agreed upon is its complex
conception of reparation, which includes early measures for the acknowl-
edgment of collective responsibilities.13 Mechanisms to implement this
include a national plan for collective reparations and territorial plans for
collective reparations, individual and collective psychosocial rehabilitation,
collective processes of return for displaced persons, and the reparation of
victims living abroad, as well as measures for land restitution.
The agreement expressly states that all groups and individuals who have
caused harm during the conﬂict must contribute to repairing the injuries they
caused and that this contribution ‘will be taken into the account in order [for
them] to receive any special treatment in matters of justice’ (Gobierno de
Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016, p. 146). This recognizes that there were several
groups other than the state and illegal armed groups that participated directly
or indirectly in the conﬂict and beneﬁted in some way from it.14 The
mechanisms outlined in the paragraph above provide avenues for this
reparation.
In addition, the agreement states that in its reincorporation into civilian
life, the FARC—EP must carry out actions that contribute to reparation. For
example, they will undertake reparatory actions by participating in the recon-
struction of infrastructure, particularly in territories aﬀected by the conﬂict; and
in programmes to remove anti-personnel mines, by participating in programmes
for the substitution of illicit crops; and by contributing to the search, location,
identiﬁcation and recovery of remains of persons reported missing or dead.
The agreement expressly aﬃrms that the FARC—EP, as an insurgent
organization, ‘commits to contributing to material reparations for victims and
in general to their comprehensive reparation, on the basis of the events iden-
tiﬁed by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace’ (Gobierno de Colombia y
FARC—EP, 2016, p. 186).15 The inclusion of this provision is in fact is one of
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the interesting outcomes of the amendment process which followed the initial
rejection of the agreements. The explicit obligation of the FARC—EP to
redress victims with their own resources was included in the amended and
adopted agreement. As the FARC—EP participated in drug production and
trade activities, extortion, and kidnapping, it is likely that they have resources
to make this contribution.
It is important to understand that the model of transitional justice proposed
for Colombia beneﬁts from Colombia’s long experience with reparations, and
the establishment of an institutional capacity for this (see Chapter 4). The
agreement on victims has the potential to articulate and strengthen proce-
dures for reparation within the context of existing legislation and institutions.
Guarantees of non-repetition
Achieving peace whilst avoiding a relapse into violence is an important goal:
however, its attainment depends on the extent of the actual and eﬀective
implementation of the provisions in the agreement, including the mechanisms
regarding victims. Besides the measures on victims, the accord also creates a
unit for persecuting criminals and dismantling criminal organizations. As was
shown by the experience of the demobilization and reinsertion of former
members of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)16 as part of the
peace process with the paramilitaries, such measures are necessary to address
the risk that criminal structures will continue operating (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2015).
Even in the case of a full demobilization and reintegration into civilian life
by the totality of the FARC—EP, a series of armed groups that operate in
diﬀerent parts of the country (paramilitaries or other guerrilla groups) will
remain. Their existence presents a looming risk to the agreements and their
implementation, as these groups may attempt to proﬁt from the power
vacuum generated by the demobilization of FARC—EP units. There is also a
high risk of retaliations against former combatants and demobilized cadres17
(MAPP/OEA, 2017). In the case of Colombia, the possibility of non-repetition
depends on the dismantlement of other insurgent and criminal organizations
across the country. This in turn depends on the consolidation of other peace
processes, ensuring the monopoly of violence by the state, and the establish-
ment of mechanisms that could demobilize these groups—which is something
to bear in mind as regards the current peace process with the Ejército de
Liberación Nacional (ELN)18.
The Special Jurisdiction for Peace
To analyse the structure of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, it is important
to consider the Justice and Peace Law (JPL),19 and how the experience in
implementing it informs the current framework. It can be argued that the
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current transitional justice setting was in fact incepted by the lessons learned
in enacting the JPL.
The lessons from the Justice and Peace Law
During the ﬁrst peace process with the paramilitary forces undertaken by the
Colombian Government, the Uribe administration created a legal framework
for facilitating the demobilization of the AUC. The draft legislation was very
generous in protecting the rights of the victims in its declaration of principles,
but did not establish legal instruments to implement these rights. The draft
bill sought a formula for peace that did not meet the demands for justice for
the victims of the crimes committed by the AUC (Uprimny Yepes & Saﬀon
Sanín, 2006). This legislation became the Justice and Peace Law, Law 975
(Congreso de Colombia, 2005).20
After this law was approved by Congress, the Constitutional Court of
Colombia reviewed the legislation, considering the challenges brought against
it by organizations and citizens who claimed that Law 975 did not guarantee
victims’ rights (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2016). The rulings by the
Constitutional Court and the modiﬁcations this court made to Law 975
sought to provide legal instruments that, while oﬀering generous reductions of
penalties to the armed actors, would also seek to guarantee the victims’ rights
to truth and reparation (Uprimny Yepes & Saﬀon Sanín, 2006).
Despite the modiﬁcations of the Constitutional Court, additional problems
were associated with the implementation of the JPL. These related to the
institutional weaknesses of the judicial system in Colombia and the lack of
appropriate legal instruments to ensure that the mandate of the law was
achieved (Uprimny Yepes, et al., 2006). The JPL appeared not to have taken
into account the context of institutional weakness inherent in the Colombian
criminal justice system, and in this sense failed to consider and establish
mechanisms and procedures to respond to these challenges. The JPL, as
approved by Congress, was a law created to respond to an extraordinary
situation, enacted with ordinary tools (de Gamboa, 2010).
The emergence of challenges facing the implementation of the law was thus
no surprise. These included: the low capacity of the criminal justice system;
insuﬃcient co-operation between the diﬀerent state agencies involved in the
process; diﬃculties in eﬀectively monitoring the demobilization and reinser-
tion of the members of the armed groups; a lack of clarity regarding which
governmental entity was responsible for the process of DDR; problems of co-
ordination among state institutions in managing and using information rela-
ted to the JPL process; the absence of resources to protect ex-combatants,
witnesses, victims, prosecutors, and judges; and the creation of institutions
with several duties but without the clear legal mandate or enough resources to
fulﬁl them (International Crisis Group, 2006).
Signiﬁcant power and economic asymmetries between the demobilized
AUC members and the victims were also not addressed by the law (see
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Chapters 6 and 7). Therefore the guarantees of victims’ rights depended
almost entirely on the capacity of the state and its institutions to guarantee
the legitimate defence of the victims’ rights in a context where demobilized
AUCmembers were better positioned to command eﬀective legal representation
(de Gamboa, 2010).
The negotiations with the FARC—EP regarding the victims and their
rights thus departed from the Santos Government’s recognition that previous
transitional justice norms, such as the JPL, did not fully assure victims’ rights,
the promotion of peace, or the strengthening of the rule of law. The previous
peace process with the paramilitaries produced just thirty-ﬁve sentences from
the pool of 4,643 cadres that had been identiﬁed to be charged. The process
with the paramilitaries appeared to operate as a de facto amnesty, and
demonstrated the challenges of implementing a transitional justice framework
in Colombia (Verdad Abierta, 2015).
The Government also acknowledged other failures from the peace process
with the paramilitaries. The truth mechanisms implemented were recognized as
very limited, since they depended on what the paramilitaries chose to admit in
the judicial proceedings. In addition, the negotiation team recognized the
tensions between a maximalist tradition (the obligation of the state to prose-
cute all grave violations of human rights) and an approach valuing peace and
non-repetition; and the challenge of ﬁnding a normative pathway balancing
concerns for justice, peace, and non-repetition in a context with strongly held
claims, often without available supporting evidence (Orozco Abad, 2012).
The negotiators adopted a hybrid approach, able to meet international
standards whilst responding to the particularities of the Colombian context.
The Justice Component of the Agreement on Victims
When the FARC—EP entered into a negotiation process with the Colombian
Government, they did not entertain the possibility of embracing a transitional
justice framework. They considered this system to be created by their oppo-
nent (the Colombian state), and they argued their actions in rebelling against
the state should not make them punishable (El Espectador, 2015). However,
by the end of the peace process, the FARC—EP had committed themselves to
a transitional justice framework that complied with international standards
and to a comprehensive agreement on victims’ rights.
The agreement on victims supports the creation of a Special Jurisdiction for
Peace. This agreement managed to address concerns about the sovereignty
and self-determination of the state whilst complying with the principles of
international human rights law. The jurisdiction will consider serious human
rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law committed
in the course of the conﬂict between the FARC—EP and the state.
The jurisdiction applies to all those who participated directly or indirectly
in the armed conﬂict. This includes members of the FARC—EP, representa-
tives from the state,21 and other individuals or groups who were not
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combatants but who engaged in the ﬁnancing of or collaboration with para-
military groups, without having been coerced to do so (Gobierno de Colom-
bia y FARC—EP, 2016).22
The agreements deﬁned a jurisdiction that is not solely focused on the dyad
of the government and the FARC—EP. In that sense, the agreements and the
jurisdiction set in place can promote a wider reconciliation that transcends the
process with the FARC—EP. As it stands now, all groups and individuals can
recognize their responsibilities in the armed conﬂict, and all have the same
opportunity to take advantage of certain legal beneﬁts in order to establish
the truth about their responsibility and assure the reparation of victims. As
such, the agreements speak to a wider notion of peace beyond the agreements
with the FARC—EP. In addition, they establish the possibility of creating a
framework that can be easily implemented should other groups decide to
negotiate their demobilization with the state.
The jurisdiction established by the agreements aims to investigate crimes
against humanity. The agreement recognizes that according to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), those who commit these
crimes are not eligible for amnesties or pardons. Although judges can prior-
itize those ultimately responsible and focus on certain serious crimes, they
must investigate all the grave crimes enumerated without restrictions.23
Second, the jurisdiction establishes a series of incentives for those who com-
mitted grave crimes to submit to justice voluntarily (in return for some bene-
ﬁts) and disincentives to those electing not to submit to this voluntarily (they
will face more severe sanctions). In all cases, oﬀenders must also submit
themselves to the other components of the comprehensive system contained
in the agreement on victims (truth, reparation, and non-repetition).
Guerrillas that submit themselves to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace will
not have their political rights aﬀected. This implies that former FARC—EP
cadres are still eligible for public posts and can run for election at a local,
regional or national level. This has been strongly criticized by the opposition
to the peace agreements, who argue that those citizens who committed crimes
should not be eligible to participate in politics at all. A series of conditions
has been decided by the Constitutional Court of Colombia in order to clarify
the ambiguity with regards to the tension between justice and political parti-
cipation for guerrillas brought by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Corte
Constitucional de Colombia, 2017). For guerrillas to maintain the beneﬁts of
the special jurisdiction, they will have to comply with all the requirements of
the special justice court for truth and reparation of the victims, as well as a
not being involved in any criminal activity after 1 December 2016. Otherwise
they will lose all the beneﬁts of the transitional justice framework.
The agreement also acknowledges the existence of political crimes. There-
fore it gives the state space to operate within international humanitarian law
and the Colombian Constitution, allowing the state to grant amnesty exclu-
sively to FARC—EP rebels. The amnesty law approved by the Colombian
Congress establishes the criteria and enumerates the diﬀerent political crimes
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that will be eligible for amnesty. These include rebellion, sedition, military
uprising, and assassination in combat compatible with international humanitarian
law. It also links drug traﬃcking to political oﬀences if the purpose of this
activity (drug traﬃcking) was linked to the ﬁnancing of rebellion, not for the
purpose of personal enrichment.
A series of provisions was tabled with regard to the members of the security
forces. In 2016, Congress established a similar arrangement resembling the
amnesty and pardons given to the FARC—EP24 in Law 1820. As with the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace, amnesties or pardons for crimes against
humanity are not granted under this Law. In addition, these beneﬁts will not
apply in the case where oﬀences constitute a threat to the morale, discipline,
interests and honour of the armed forces, in accordance with the military
penal code. In addition, these beneﬁts are conditional on state agents’ fulﬁl-
ment of their obligation to make reparations to victims and contribute
towards the truth (Congreso de Colombia, 2016b).
Figure 5.2 How does the special jurisdiction for peace in Colombia work?
Source: Own elaboration.
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The Special Jurisdiction for Peace is composed of several bodies (see Figure
5.2). These comprise: the Chamber for the Acknowledgment of Truth,
Responsibility, and the Establishment of Facts; the Peace Tribunal; the
Chamber for Amnesty and Pardon; the Chamber for the Deﬁnition of Legal
Situations; and the Investigation and Indictments Unit.
The peace agreements achieved between the FARC—EP and the Colom-
bian Government envision a holistic transitional justice model. In line with
this vision, the agreements proclaim the connection and synergy between the
rights of victims to truth, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition. The
content of the agreements on victims create a series of institutions that aim to
redress and guarantee the rights of the victims. These institutions have been
shaped to respond to the needs and particularities of the Colombian context,
and appear to fulﬁl the requirements of international human rights standards.
If this system manages to fulﬁl its mandate in practice, it will constitute a
textbook example of a hybrid model of transitional justice (Sriram, 2010).
However, in spite of the achievement of the agreements, it is important to
reﬂect on the challenges facing their implementation.
The long road to justice and peace: From text to institutions,
justice and statehood
In order to analyse the challenges with regard to the implementation of the
transitional justice framework agreed between the FARC—EP and the
Colombian Government, it is important to understand the political context in
which the implementation of the agreements takes place and the challenges
that some provisions within the transitional justice agreements may create, as
well as the structures and the inter-institutional co-ordination required for
eﬀective implementation.
Since the agreements process began, the political landscape has become
dangerously re-polarized in Colombia. This polarization resembles the split
between political actors that preceded the bipartisan violence of the 1940s
and 1950s from which the FARC—EP emerged. This polarization was illu-
strated in the results of the plebiscite on the peace agreement and the related
debates in the Colombian Congress. The Santos Government has the majority
in the Congress, which has allowed the translation of the agreements into
normative and operative laws, such as the Amnesty Law (Congreso de
Colombia, 2016a), and the law that regulates the transitional justice system
(Congreso de Colombia, 2017). These advances can be rolled back if oppo-
nents to the agreements decide to reform the peace agreements (El País,
2017). Thus, if a political party that opposes the agreements ﬁlibusters the
implementation of the peace agreement or wins the next elections, they can
stiﬂe or reverse the implementation of the transitional justice agreements. If
this occurs, the stalled or stunted implementation of the agreements would
fall short of the commitments signed in the agreements, leading to a default
on peace agreements produced by selective negligence.
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Within the provisions of the agreements, there is great concern in relation
to the provisions related to the crimes committed by members of the Colom-
bian armed forces (Revista Semana, 2017). A provision regarding command
responsibility establishes that a military commander must answer for the
crimes committed by his subalterns. In this case, a superior must be accoun-
table for the actions of the soldiers under his command, even in the case when
he has not taken any active role in these actions, but through negligence or
apathy did not take appropriate corrective or preventive measures (Uprimny
Yepes, 2017). This provision can be interpreted to apply to civilians as well.
International human rights practice establishes that the proof of knowledge
by a superior of the crimes committed by his subalterns can be based upon
eﬀective or inferred knowledge.25 It also states that hierarchical responsibility
is ascribed on a case-by-case basis; it thus allows inquiries into cases where
control and leadership is exerted de facto. However, in the legislation that
regulates the agreements, only explicit and eﬀective knowledge is considered
as proof. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace would thus not be able to inves-
tigate and inquire into cases where military commanders were negligent.
There is therefore the risk of the provision of half-truths in the cases where
members of the armed forces committed human rights violations. In addition,
the laws and regulations tabled in Congress will limit the understanding of the
command responsibility; with the eﬀect of limiting the scope of investigations
and interventions by the ICC. This may mean that in some cases the actions of
military commanders will not be prosecuted at all. The decision by the
Colombian constitutional court with regards to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
did not elaborate on this, keeping alive the risk that the framework imple-
mented in Colombia might not fulﬁl international standards of transitional
justice (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2017).
In addition, questions remain with regard to the incentives for civilians
involved in the conﬂict (for example as sponsors of armed groups) to partici-
pate in the transitional justice process as witnesses or subjects of legal inquiry.
While they may not have criminal responsibility (e.g. an industrial agent who
was extorted and funded a particular group, or a cattle grower who funded
counter-insurgency paramilitary groups), they could have information and
knowledge of the actions in the conﬂict that are vital to establishing the full
truth and to enabling state institutions to understand the organizations and
agents that were linked to war and violence. The decision by the Constitu-
tional Court declared that third parties such as civilians involved in the con-
ﬂict cannot be obliged to participate in this jurisdiction. However, this does
not absolve them (civilians) from their legal or penal responsibility. Therefore
civilians should be judged by the existing judicial institutions and courts.
Thus, it would be expected that those civilians who want to beneﬁt from the
legal framework for peace could present themselves voluntarily to the Special
Jurisdiction for Peace (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2017).
Although the implementation of the transitional justice agreements is
necessary for peace, transitional justice by itself it is not suﬃcient. Inter-
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institutional coordination, commitment, and political consistency are required
from the state, so that the other elements of the agreement (relating to political
participation, rural reform, demobilization, illicit crops and drug production)
are implemented. These additional elements of the agreements point to other
structural issues that deﬁne the Colombian conﬂict. Without solid institutions
in place, the road for peace will be bumpy; however, peace-making always
departs from a point of state weakness, rather than strength and eﬃciency.26
This is the departure point for Colombia, as the state aims to consolidate its
institutions and navigate towards peace and a new social covenant.
It is in this context that the agreed-upon transitional justice system will
take its place. The ambitious aims and objectives of the transitional justice
agreements require eﬃciency, synergies, and a holistic operation from state
institutions to ensure that victims’ rights are redressed and the structural
conditions that gave rise to the conﬂict can be dealt with. However, there is
still ambiguity regarding how the agreements will be enacted, as laws reg-
ulating the provisions of the agreements conform to the text of the agreements
verbatim. The agreements have deﬁned the goals for the state, but not the
processes of how to reach these goals. The repetition of objectives will not
realize them, and may risk creating a hollow mythology of justice and peace
that can in fact erode the legitimacy of the state in the long term.
While the laws, norms and principles tabled in Congress aim to achieve peace,
the practice of implementing the peace agreement is still uncertain.27 It is vital to
develop a clear series of guidelines and principles that operationalize the agree-
ments and the processes associatedwith them. Explicitly articulating the way these
synergies must take place will reduce the risk of tensions, misunderstandings and
delays that can compromise the approach to peace for Colombia.
Notes
1 This text is part of the research project, ‘Public Policies against the Armed Conﬂict
in Colombia and Transitional Justice’. It is also framed within the research project,
‘The Residues of Evil in Post-Totalitarian Societies: Responses from the Perspec-
tive of Democratic Politics’, reference FFI2012–31635, ﬁnanced by the Spanish
Ministry of Finance and Competitiveness.
2 The ‘fast-track’ mechanism allows the shortening of the processes that laws usually
have to go through in Colombia, reducing the number of debates in the Senate and
the Chamber in Congress.
3 The outcome of the vote was: 50.21% of voters voted opposing the agreements and
49.79% voted in favour of the agreements (6,431,376 votes to 6,377,482 votes). The
abstention rate was 63% of eligible voters (21,833,898).
4 Democratic Centre.
5 Agreement on Victims of the Armed Conﬂict: A Comprehensive System of Truth,
Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition, including the Special Jurisdiction for
Peace; and the Commitment to Human Rights.
6 La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No
repetición.
7 Unidad especial para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas en el con-
texto y en razón del conﬂicto armado.
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8 Jurisdicción especial para la paz.
9 According to a former Colombian Government oﬃcial, ‘serious violations’ are
those committed in accordance with a plan or policy.
10 Such as the reports from the Grupo de Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory
Group), created by the Peace and Justice Law (Law 975). Nowadays, this group
has become the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (Center for Historical
Memory), a national public entity.
11 The Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas (Historical Commission on
the Conﬂict and its Victims) was established as part of the negotiation process. The
ﬁnal report comprises diﬀerent narratives on the description and explanation of
the Colombian conﬂict (Comisión Histórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2014).
12 According to the Unidad de Víctimas (Victims Unit), 45,646 Colombians have
been ‘disappeared’ since 1985.
13 This form of collective responsibility for wrongs committed, as described in the
ﬁnal agreement, is more akin to political apology than to acts of forgiveness.
Although the agreement refers to forgiveness, in the public discourse of Colombian
groups, in the Justice and Peace Law (Law 975), and in the agreement between the
FARC—EP and the Colombian Government, there is a tendency to describe col-
lective acts acknowledging responsibility as acts of interpersonal forgiveness.
However, interpersonal forgiveness is a private and a volitional act between oﬀen-
ders and oﬀended. In political apologies, a person who publicly represents an
institution, organization or other group, recognizes the wrongs committed by such
groups, and does so in their name (Griswold, 2007; de Greiﬀ, 2008; de Gamboa &
Herrera, In Press).
14 It is not clear if those who beneﬁted from the violence have to contribute towards
reparations.
15 In principle, if the FARC—EP has any material goods, they must report them.
Otherwise they would not be ‘contributing comprehensively’ to reparations, which
could negatively aﬀect the legal beneﬁts that they enjoy as a party to the
agreement.
16 United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia.
17 These retaliations could occur because some guerrillas retaliate against the FARC-
EP because they agreed to peace, or take place in order to provoke violence to
ensure the conﬂict continues.
18 National Liberation Army.
19 Ley de Justicia y Paz.
20 Ley 975 de 2005.
21 The Agreement establishes diﬀerent conditions that apply to the judgment of
agents of the state.
22 The Constitutional Court of Colombia decided that the Special Jurisdiction of
Peace could not oblige civilians to subject to the special jurisdiction. Thus, the
involvement of civilians in the JEP will be only take place when civilians present
themselves voluntarily to it.
23 In fact, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
stated that the justice system outlined in the agreement complies with the Rome
Statute (El Tiempo, 2016).
24 Opposition from retired members from the Armed Forces rejected the possibility
of them to be judged under the same system as the FARC—EP.
25 This can be proved when with the information available to superiors could allow
leaders to infer the possibility of atrocities.
26 Some Colombian analysts equate this process to trying to sail a ship on rough seas
while attempting to ﬁx it (Pizarro Leongómez & Valencia, 2009).
27 Examples of this are the norms that regulate the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and
the Commission for the Clariﬁcation of Truth, which do not explain or provide
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guidance on how institutions can co-operate and share information with regards to
judicial and extra-judicial inquest.
References
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2015. Rearmados y Reintegrados: Panorama
posacuerdos con las AUC. [Online] Available at: www.centrodememoriahistorica.
gov.co/descargas/informes2015/desmovilizacionDesarmeReintegracion/rearma
dos-y-reintegrados-panorama-postacuerdos-auc.pdf [Last accessed 17 July 2017].
ComisiónHistórica del Conﬂicto y sus Víctimas, 2014. Comisión Histórica del Con-
ﬂicto y sus Víctimas. [Online] Available at: http://equipopazgobierno.presidencia.
gov.co/especiales/resumen-informe-comision-historica-conﬂicto-victimas/index.html
[Last accessed 15 June 2017].
Congreso de Colombia, 2005. Ley 975 de 2005. [Online] Available at: www.cejil.org/
sites/default/ﬁles/ley_975_de_2005_0.pdf [Last accessed 18 July 2017].
Congreso de Colombia, 2016a. Por medio del cual se establecen instrumentos jurídicos
para facilitar y asegurar la implementación y el desarrollo normativo del Acuerdo
Final para la terminación del conﬂicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera.
[Online] Available at: http://es.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/ACTO%20LEG
ISLATIVO%2001%20DEL%207%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202016.pdf [Last acces-
sed 14 June 2017].
Congreso de Colombia, 2016b. Ley 1820 de 2016. [Online] Available at: http://es.pre
sidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/LEY%201820%20DEL%2030%20DE%20DICIE
MBRE%20DE%202016.pdf [Last accessed 18 July 2017].
Congreso de Colombia, 2017. Acto Legislativo 01 de 2017. [Online] Available at:
http://es.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%20N
%C2%B0%2001%20DE%204%20DE%20ABRIL%20DE%202017.pdf [Last accessed
17 July 2017].
Corte Constitucionalde Colombia, 2016. Sentencia C-379- de 2016. [Online] Available at:
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2016/c-379-16.htm [Last accessed 14 June
2017].
Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2017. No. 55 comunicado 14 de noviembre de
2017—Corte Constitucional. [Online] Available at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
comunicados/No.%2055%20comunicado%2014%20de%20noviembre%20de%20201
7.pdf. [Last accessed 1 December 2017].
de Gamboa, C. & Herrera, W., In press. Las disculpas políticas y su propósito en la
justicia transicional. In Cartografías del Mal. Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre.
de Gamboa, C., 2010. The Colombian Government’s Formulas for Peace with the
AUC: An Interpretation from the Perspective of Political Realism. In Contested
Transitions. Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Colombia and Comparative Experi-
ence. Bogotá: International Center for Transitional Justice, pp. 61–86.
Last accessedDe Greiﬀ, P., 2008. The role of apologies in national reconciliation pro-
cesses: On making trustworthy institutions trusted. InThe age of apology: Facing up
to the past. Philadelphia, PA: United Nations University, pp. 120–134.
De Greiﬀ, P., 2012. Informe del Relator Especial sobre la promoción de la verdad, la
justicia, la reparación y las garantías de no repetición, Pablo de Greiﬀ. [Online]
Available at: www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Ses
sion21/A-HRC-21-46_sp.pdf [Last accessed 15 March 2017].
82 The Transitional Justice Framework
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
El Espectador, 2015. Farc rechazan que se les aplique justicia diseñada para ‘bandas
criminales’. [Online] Available at: www.elespectador.com/noticias/paz/farc-rechaza
n-se-les-aplique-justicia-disenada-bandas-c-articulo-554244 [Last accessed 18 July
2017].
El País, 2017. ¿Habrá alianza de la derecha para las elecciones presidenciales del 2018?.
[Online] Available at: www.elpais.com.co/colombia/habra-alianza-de-la-derecha-pa
ra-las-elecciones-presidenciales-del-2018.html [Last accessed 17 July 2017].
El Tiempo, 2016. CPI dice que acuerdo con Farc es ‘un logro histórico para Colombia’.
[Online] Available at: www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/la-corte-pena
l-internacional-apoya-el-proceso-de-paz-31007 [Last accessed 17 July 2017].
FundaciónIdeas para la Paz, 2016a. El país que develó la ventaja del No. [Online]
Available at: http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1411 [Last accessed 9
October 2016].
Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2016b. Especial: Los debates sobre Justicia Trancisional.
[Online] Available at: www.ideaspaz.org/especiales/justicia-transicional/farc/descarga
s/plantillaGuion2.pdf [Last accessed 18 July 2017].
Gobierno de Colombia y FARC—EP, 2016. Final Agreement to End the Armed Con-
ﬂict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. [Online] Available at: www.altocomisiona
doparalapaz.gov.co/Prensa/Documentos%20compartidos/Colombian-Peace-Agreem
ent-English-Translation.pdf [Last accessed 28 December 2016].
Griswold, C., 2007. Forgiveness: A philosophical exploration. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
International Crisis Group, 2006. Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice? [Online]
Available at: www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/colombia
-towards-peace-and-justice [Last accessed 18 July 2017].
La Silla Vacia, 2016. Detector de mentiras a Uribe sobre el acuerdo ﬁnal. [Online]
Available at: http://lasillavacia.com/historia/detector-de-mentiras-uribe-sobre-el-a
cuerdo-ﬁnal-57734 [Last accessed 15 October 2016].
MAPP/OEA, 2017. El Tiempo: Así está la seguridad en las regiones del país, según la
OEA. [Online] Available at: www.mapp-oea.org/noticias/el-tiempo-asi-esta-la-segur
idad-en-las-regiones-del-pais-segun-la-oea/[Last accessed 18 July 2017].
Orozco Abad, I., 2012. Lineamientos de política para la paz negociada y la justicia
post-conﬂicto. [Online] Available at: http://archive.ideaspaz.org/images/ivanorozcop
oliticadepaz.pdf [Last accessed 17 July 2017].
Pizarro Leongómez, E. & Valencia, L., 2009. Ley de justicia y paz. Bogotá: Norma.
RegistraduríaNacionaldelEstado Civil, 2016. Colombianos habilitados para votar en el
Plebiscito 2016. [Online] Available at: www.registraduria.gov.co/?page=plebiscito_
2016 [Last accessed 14 July 2017].
Revista Semana, 2016. ¿Y ahora qué? [Online] Available at: www.semana.com/nacion/a
rticulo/gana-el-no-en-el-plebiscito-y-ahora-que/496635 [Last accessed 18 July 2017].
Revista Semana, 2017. El acuerdo de paz de Colombia demanda respeto, pero también
responsabilidad. [Online] Available at: www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/deseo-
corte-penal-internacional-justicia-transicional-en-colombia/512820 [Last accessed 14
June 2017].
Sriram, C. L., 2010. Resolving Conﬂicts and Pursuing Accountability: Beyond Justice
Versus Peace. In O. Richmond, ed. Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding. s.l.: Pal-
grave Macmillan, pp. 279–293.
The Transitional Justice Framework 83
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia; edited by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Pabón
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Times New Roman;
Dir: P:/Frontlist Production Teams/eProduction/Live Projects/9781857438659/
dtp/9781857438659_text.3d;
Uprimny Yepes, R., 2017. Responsabilidad de mando y JEP: un debate complejo y
polarizado. [Online] Available at: http://lasillavacia.com/blogs/responsabilidad-del-ma
ndo-y-jep-un-debate-complejo-y-polarizado-59906 [Last accessed 15 June 2017].
Uprimny Yepes, R., Rodriguez Garavito, C. & Garcia Villegas, M., 2006. Las cifras de
la justicia. In ¿Justicia para todos? Sistema judicial, Derechos y Democracia en
Colombia. Bogotá: Norma, pp. 319–399.
Uprimny Yepes, R. & Saﬀon Sanín, M. P., 2006. ¿ Al ﬁn, ley de justicia y paz? La ley
975 de 2006 tras el fallo de la Corte Constitucional. In ¿Justicia transicional sin
transición? Bogotá: Dejusticia, pp. 199–230.
Verdad Abierta, 2015. ¿Qué nos dejan 10 años de justicia y paz?. [Online] Available at:
www.verdadabierta.com/especiales-v/2015/justicia-paz-10/ [Last accessed 17 July 2017].
84 The Transitional Justice Framework
